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This period in Rhodesian history witnessed a remarkable change 
in the relationship between white settlers and the Aborigines! Protection 
Society. (1) From a relationship of mutual hostility and distrust, the 
two contracted what with hindsight appears an incongmous alliance as a 
result of which the APS, believing that African interests would be better 
served by settler democracy than Company rule, gave their full support to 
the cause of Responsible Government, which was achieved in 1923. Tnis 
paper seeks to understand why this alliance was originally contracted, 
what it achieved, and why after 1923 it was dissolved. 
The APS considered white settlement in southern Africa in the 
nineteenth c e n t w  to be necessary and, indeed, inevitable. When combined 
with missionary influence,it could provide a civilizing agency, a 
necessary outlet for the surplus population of Great Britain and Ireland, 
and a means of utilizing "vacant" and !'waste lands" which were bound to 
be settled eventually. (2) However, in order that African interests, 
and particularly their rights regarding land and labour, be safeguarded 
and in order that African tribes might be protected from the sale of 
mopean spirits, a certain kind of settler was required and certain 
conditions of government were necessary. Portuguese and other 
"adventurers", and in particular Boers, were rejected as settlers by the 
A'S, who felt that their expropriation of land and exploitation of labour 
were inimical to African interests. What was required were "respectable 
and capable European farmers and ranchers to be established in vacant 
parts of the country". ( 3 )  As a result of their experiences in South 
Africa with local legislatures, from the 1880s they advocated direct 
imperial control through British officials where any extension of 
British rule was made. Thus they opposed the granting of a Charter to 
the British South Africa Company in 1889 to rule Rhodesia, on the 
grounds that the colony should be governed directly by Britain and that 
a commercial and trading company should not have administrative powers 
over Africans. Moreover, the BSACo were "gold speculators" and 
"adventurers" and Rhodes 1 attitude on native questions was "Dutch" rather 
than r!Englishlr. During the period 1889-1896 they attacked the Company 
for obtaining a Charter on the basis of what they saw as spurious 
concessions, for deliberately provoking a war against Lobengula in 
1893, and for maladministration of the country which the rebellions had 
revealed. (4) In particular, they attacked the Company for the 
expropriation of African land and cattle and the imposition of forced 
labour, charges which were made in Sir Richard Martints Report on the 
Rebellions. (5) 
The hostility of the APS to the Company during this period 
inevitably reflected their attitude to the settlers. This was because, 
during the pioneer period, settler and Company interests were 
indistinguishable. As Professor Ranger has emphasised, from the arrival 
of the Pioneer Colmm in 1890 Rhodesia was a colony in which the 
settler element was of crucial importance, depending for its success on 
white economic enterprise and white armed support even before the 
settlers had any say in policy or representation in the Legislature. (6) 
It was only when these interests separated as a result of widespread 
settler dissatisfaction with the Company after the Rebellions that the 
APS were able to define a definite relationship with the settlers and, 
indeed, only then were they able to obtain local information on the 
running of the Administration. 
To some extent the settlers were seen by the APS as victims of 
Company policy. Left isolated by Company maladminiatration, with the 
Company forces absent when the rebellion broke out, it was the British 
Government which had had to step in and rescue them from the rebellious 
inhabitants. (7) Although the settlers had participated in "the 
merciless slaughter of thousands" in the rebellion, it had been an 
uprising caused by Company maladministration and the settlers, like 
Olive Schreinerfs "Trooper Halket of Mashonalandlf, could be made to see 
the error of their ways. (8) Partly because of their mutual feelings 
of hostility to the Company at this time, partly perhaps because of the 
middle class origins of the members of the Society, and partly because 
of the late Victorian idealization of the English settler, the APS saw 
the settler for a brief period as the representative of private 
enterprise, the small man struggling to establish himself against a 
monopolistic company. ( 9 )  However, in spite of these feelings of 
sympathy, it was recognized by the APS that their views on Africans and, 
arising out of this, their views on African rights, particularly 
regarding land and labour, conflicted strongly with settler views. 
The APS had been strongly influenced by the nineteenth century 
missionary tradition, which tended to denigrate African institutions and 
customs in order to emphasise the need for Christianity. Africans were 
lTprimitiveV and llsavagell; they were weak and had to be protected from 
exploitation. None the less they had rights, particularly the right to 
ownership of land in their own country and the right to sell their 
labour at the best market price. When divested of their natural habits 
and mores they could be raised to the level of European civilization and 
they could achieve social equality through education. As the Chairman 
of the APS said in 1901, "The difference between a white man and a black 
man was simply one of education and heredity and in the course of not 
ma.ny generations given equal educational opportunities with white men 
the nativawould prove their equalityn. (10) 
Rhodesian settler attitudes to Africans, although more 
thoughtful after the rebellions, according to Professor Kanger, were 
none the less motivated by fear. (11) The rebellions, in which Africans 
had unexpectedly turned on their white masters, had proved that Africans 
were unpredictable and must be ruled with a firm hand in future. They 
must be made to work within the white economy and not allowed to idle 
away time on the land provided for them. Social equality was out of the 
question, and Africans who wore European dress and boasted Ehropean 
education were being pretentious. 
On the issue of land these different attitudes to Africans 
showed themselves most clearly. The APS had condemned the Company!s 
wholesale alienation of land in the 1890s to European farmers and 
companies, and the Companyts failure to provide adequate land for 
Africans as enjoined on them by the Charter. The land provided for 
Africans in the 1894 settlement was inadequate and unsuitable, and after 
the rebellions they pressed the British Government to require the 
Company to make a more generous land settlement. (12) Although the APS 
welcomed the major allocation of land to Africans in 1902, as far as they 
were concerned it did not solve the predicament of over half the African 
population who were living outside these areas. They therefore 
concentrated their efforts on obtaining security of tenure for Africans 
living on European farms and for African ownership of the land still 
unalienated. 
The settlers were against the provision of any more land for 
Africans. As Arrighi has shown, the settlers were in economic competition 
with tribal economies as agricultural producers,and in this competition 
ownership of land was the key factor. (13) In any case, Africans must 
be made to work, and this became a crucial issue because of the permanent 
labour shortage during the early years of the colony. Higher pay 
offered by the mining companies within Rhodesia and on the Rand, and the 
need for quavltity rather than quality of labour required by the settlers, 
led them to press the Company to provide a Secretary for Labour and to 
increase the hut tax as a means of making Africans work. The APS, to 
whom forced labour was a vital matter because of their origins in the 
Anti-Slavery movement, pressed the British Government not to allow an 
increase in hut tax, not because they were against a hut tax as such but 
because they would not accept that it could be used as an incentive to 
labour. "The idea in the minds of all the white men in South Africa is 
how best the natives could be employed merely as cheap labour" (314), 
reported the Aborigines! Friend. "With these misguided enthusiasts there 
is no medium between idleness and slavery; honest toil under the 
guiding and protecting hand of their own fellow countrymen is strictly 
condemned", stated Rhodesia in 1898. (15) The success of philanthropic 
pressure on the British Government in causing it to take a firmer line 
with the Company over labour recruitment and the hut tax increased the 
Companyfs intense dislike of the APS and, anxious to reduce imperial 
interference, they did their best to represent to the colonists that it 
was them that the APS was attacking. (16) 
During this period, therefore, although the APS saw the 
settlers to some extent as victims of Company policy, they were none 
the less potential exploiters of Africans. The settlers, for their 
part, saw the APS as sentimentalists and negrophiles.,"The ignorant 
mob that persists in venerating an ideal of the Kafir races is set to 
ride colonists to their destructionll, said the Rhodesia Herald of 24th 
October 1901; the APS were "theoristsf1 and llcanting visionaries": 
"those who live alongside the native know; those who have only seen 
show specimens at a circus or at missionary fund raising meetings do not 
know". (17) Such was the hostility of the APS to the settlers that 
Milner rebuked them in 1901 for their "tone of unjustified suspicion and 
almost of hostility towards their fellow countrymen in South Africa", 
and added llmost especially would I raise a warning voice against the 
fatal doctrine that the Imperial Government is to deal with the native 
question regardless of colonial sentiment" for "the time must come 
before many years when the native and other local affairs pass under 
local control". (18) In the meantime, as long as settler and Company 
interests clashed with African interests, the APS urged continuing 
British control in matters affecting Africans. (19) 
In 1914 the Organizing Secretary of the amalgamated Anti- 
Slavery and Aborigines! Protection Society, John Harris, went to 
Rhodesia to collect affidavits from Rhodesian Africans whom the APS 
were representing through their solicitors in the dispute before the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council concerning the ownership of the 
unalienated land in Rhodesia. He found the influence of the Company 
everywhere. "The Company either commercially or administratively has an 
interest direct or indirect in every enterprise whether it be the land, 
bank or the gold mine, the railway system or missionary enterprise, the 
cathedral or the bacon factory, tobacco cultivation or ranching; its 
influence is all pervading and holds men in a thraldom they resent but 
from which they see no immediate chance of escape." (20) Although he 
had been given limited support for his mission by Lord Buxton, the High 
Co;mraissioner, Harris was forbidden by the Company to approach Africans. 
Once the Companyls attitude to Harris was known, no solicitors wanted to 
be involved in the preparation of the native case. As for the majority 
of missionaries, "from the d w  that they heard that the Board (of the 
British South Africa company) had stopped us we have been cut dead and 
might have leprosy the way they have treated us", wrote Harris to 
- Travers Buxton. (21) In this isolated position Harris was extremely 
relieved to discover "a few strong and trusty counsellors in that 
little band of honest men who have for years fought the Company against 
overwhelming oddsf1. (22) From these contacts, initiated in 1914,with 
Sir Charles Coghlan (first Prime Minister of Rhodesia) and H. U. Moffat 
(son of the missionary J. S.  offa at) , J. McClery and H. Longden, members 
of the Legislative Assembly, grew the alliance which was to culminate in 
the APSls support for Responsible Government. 
There were, I think, four main reasons for this alliance 
between the APS and the settlers. Firstly, their mutual hostility to 
the Chartered Company which brought them together initially; secondly, 
the APSlsfailure to make contacts with other sections of the population 
in Rhodesia and .thus to obtain local information essential to the 
effective operation of the APS as a pressure group in England; thirdly, 
the failure of the APSB attempts to secure African interests in land as 
they saw them during this period, and their consequent commitment by 
1920 to some form of segregation which brought them into line, although 
for quite different reasons, with settler thinking on the land issue; 
fourthly, the settler desire to convince the British Government that 
they would safeguard the ftTrustff in the event of self-government. 
It was on the basis of their mutual hostility to the Company 
and tie APSB need for contacts within Rhodesia which would provide them 
with the essential local information to inform their campaign in England 
that the alliance between the settlers and the APS originated. Harris 
aqpented the criticisms of Company rule of the Pox Bourne era with an 
almost paranoic hatred of the Chartered Company, originating partly from 
the philosophy which he brought with him from his contacts with 
E. D. More1 in the Congo Reform Association, with its condemnation of 
monopolistic companies exploiting colonial populations, and partly from 
his own experiences with the ABIR Company when a missionary in the 
Congo. ( 2 3 )  On their side, the settler feelings of hostility arose from 
their desire to free themselves from a commercial company which, they 
felt, was exploiting the country and expropriating the land for its 
commercial advantage. These feelings became stronger when, in 1914, they 
achieved a majority of elected members over Company nominees in the 
Legislative Council, and in the same year the Supplemental Charter 
conceded their ultimate right to self-government. It became clear that, 
although the Company would retain its commercial interests, it would now 
keep its administrative expenditure to the minimum. This hostility 
united the APS and the settlers over issues in which their interests 
were very different. For instance, in the dispute over ownership of the 
unalienated land in 1914, the APS claimed the land on behalf of Africans 
as the rightful owners while the settlers claimed the land as the property 
of the futme administration, but both opposed the Company's claim to 
commercial ownership. Both condemned the pro-Chartered personnel of the 
Reserves Commission and its recommendation that the Reserves be cut down 
by almost a million acres, the APS because they would not agree to avly 
further cutting down of African areas and the settlers because they 
believed that the Company was trying to appropriate the land for its own 
commercial advantage. Similarly, they were united in their opposition 
to the Company, but for different reasons, over the appointment of the 
Cave Conmission in 1918 and on the issue of amalgamation with Northern 
Rhodesia. This feeling of standing together against the Company was 
very strong. As Mrs Tawse Jollie wrote to Harris in 1917, "Personally 
I believe what you say is true - the rights of the natives and the white 
man are inextricably interwoven and together constitute a barrier to the 
claims of the Companyu. (24) 
Sharing this antagonism to the Company and seeing the Company 
as a competitor over land, the settlers were able to provide the APS 
with valuable anti-Company informatj.on, keep them informed of local 
conditions, and send cuttings from local newspapers, Legislative Council 
resolutions, Responsible Government Association pamphlets. Any 
alienations of land made by the Company or sale of blocks of land to 
companies were immediately reported to the APS. The APS, in return, 
corresponded frequently with Sir Charles Coghlan, J. McClery, H. Longden, 
Mrs Tawse Jollie and H. U. Moffat, keeping them informed of APS views, 
sending copies of Parliamentary Questions asked, APS pamphlets, and 
letters to the Colonial Office. Several members of the Legislative 
Assembly even became subscribers to the Aborigines! Frienz. This local 
information, which to date the APS had had difficulty in obtaining, was 
essential to their functioning as a pressure group in England, and. in 
particular enabled their parliamentary activities to be accurately 
informed. 
The APS attached great value to this information about local 
conditions because they had been unable to make contacts either with 
the missionaries, with the important exceptions of A. S. Cripps, the 
radical Anglican missionary, and John White, a Wesleyan missionary, who 
were their traditional contacts in areas where they operated, or indeed 
with Africans. The majority of missionaries in Rhodesia regarded the 
APS with hostility. Committed to the Company initially through their 
belief that Matabele power must be broken before there could be effective 
Christianity, and by grants of land for mission stations from Rhodes, 
their dependence on the Company increased during the 1920s for a number 
of reasons which Professor Ranger has outlined. (25) In addition, 
Harris antagonized the missionaries from the first by attacking their 
policy of charging rents to Africans on mission land, and hostility 
between them grew, culminating in 1920 with a bitter correspondence 
between Harris and Bishop Beavan of Rhodesia and the attack on Harris 
at the 1920 Missionary Conference which passed a resolution approving 
the recommendations of the Reserves Commission. 
Neither had the APS made any effective contacts with Africans. 
They had attempted to approach Rhodesian Africans through their contacts, 
the African Native National Congress delegates J. L. Dube and W. Rubuaana, 
over the Privy Council Case in 1914, and Harris went to Rhodesia 
intending to get statements from leading indunas and "heirs of Lobengulal' 
and to claim the ownership of the unalienated land in Rhodesia on their 
behalf. But this brief flirtation with the ideas of popular sovereignty 
in the Rhodesian context was ended by the Companyls outright refusal to 
allow Harris to approach the Africans in any way. Lack of an 6lite 
class similar to that in West Africa precluded a,ny formation of 
Auxiliary Societies of the APS, as Dr Nworah has shown were established 
at Lagos and on the Gold Coast. (26) Henceforth, contacts with 
Rhodesian Africans were limited to requests for assistance regarding 
inLividual grievances such as the Fingoes1 appeals to the APS. 
The third main reason for the alliance between the settlers 
and the APS was the failure of their canpaign to secure African interests 
to land, as they saw them. R. H. Palmercs unpublished thesis on the 
making of land policy in Rhodesia has shown that, although the major 
alienations of land to Europeans took place in the 1890s, and a certain 
amount of land was set aside for Africans on Reserves in 1894 and 1902, 
these divisions were for several years largely a paper settlement and 
even in 1914 nearly half of the African population were living outside 
the Reserves. (27) Africans remained as tenants on European farms, as it 
was hoped they would provide a ready labour supply and Africans saw no 
reason to move from land which they had already occupied. However, with 
increased pressures on land arising mainly from the failure of the 
Company's mineral expectations and the decision to encourage white 
settlement and to develop a white agricultural policy, combined with 
Africans! disinclination to enter the white economy, attempts were made 
to implement this original division of the land to the detriment, as the 
APS saw it, of African interests in land. The assumptions on which this 
original division of the land had been made were questioned, and the 
reserves, which had been seen as areas where Africans who did not 
participate in the white economy might go, now took on a new significance 
as Africans' share of the land. 
Between 1914 and 1923 APS attention was concentrated on trying 
to obtain adequate land for Africans from land as yet unalienated to 
Ebopeans and security of tenure for Africans on land which they were 
already occupying. In 1914 they disputed the Company's claim to 
commercial ownership of the unalienated land, and when it was decided 
that the Crown was the rightful owner, they argued that the British 
Government therefore had an obligation to provide an adequate amount of 
it for Africans, particularly land which they were "beneficially" 
occupying. Ownership of the unalienated land was essential because, as 
the APS saw it, Africans had no security of tenure anywhere. On 
European farms and on land claimed by the Company, failure to pay rent 
led to eviction. Neither did they have security of tenure on the 
Reserves, in spite of the fact that these were vested in the High 
Commissioner; the Reserves Commission appointed in 1914 (dominated by 
pro-Chartered personnel who intended to take from the Reserveland 
suitable for white settlement) recommended the cutting down of the 
Reserves by one million acres, and eviction of Africans from areas 
removed from the Reserves started even before the Order in Council was 
promulgated in 1920. Public works led to further deductions from the 
Reserves: the ReserveCommission, for instance, had recornended that a 
strip 12 miles wide be taken from the Sabi Reserve for the railway. 
Neither could Africans obtain security of tenure through individual 
p~-chase of land, as, in practice, few were able to exercise the right 
which they possessed under the 1898 Order in Council to purchase land on 
the sane terms as Europeans. As far as the APS was concerned, !'no 
single native of the Mashom and Matabele and kindred tribes owns either 
personally or through membership of his tribe a foot of land, a spring 
of water, a sacred graveyard, a patch of garden or even a plot of land 
on which his native hut is erected". The Rhodesian land case raised "a 
cardinal issue of colonial policy as affecting native races ... a 
question which struck at the very roots of British colonial policy ... a 
turning point in the treatment of the African native". "At the present 
nothing is secure to the Natives in Rhodesia. Upon good cause being 
shown they can be turned off the reserves and given areas elsewhere and 
those who follow native conditions know full well how easy it is to show 
!good cause' for the removal of natives .lf (28) 
In repeated letters to the Colonial Office between 1918 and 
1920 they advocated an enquiry into the whole Rhodesian land issue, but 
in spite of this correspondence "every attempt has been met with 
obstruction, every effort to secure modest reforms has been repelled and 
thus the Committee has been driven almost against its will to the 
platform and into the press". (29) Their parliamentary campaign took on 
a new, vigorous aspect in 1920 when traditional Liberal support was 
augmented by considerable Labour Party support. In January 1920 an 
appeal to the Prime Minister was signed by forty-five MPS, religious 
support was secured from the Anglican Church and the Society of Friends, 
and the National Council of Ev=gelical Free Churches sent in nation- 
wide petitions. In writings, such as Harris's book, Chartered Millions, 
and in pamphlets and articles, the APS urged consideration of the 
Rhodesian Land issue. (30) Yet, in spite of this campaign, no 
Commission of Enquiry was appointed and in 1920 the British Government 
approved the recommendations of the 1914 Reserves Commission. 
By 1920 the M S  had come to the conclusion that a certain 
measure of segregation in the Rhodesian context was inevitable. "... A 
complete restoration of the land to the natives is impracticable and 
that however regrettable it may be the rights of natives living on lands 
sold or given to the white men must be sacrificed." (31) However, in 
view of the rate at which land was being alienated, there was an urgent 
necessity to provide adequate reserve areas "secure in title, sufficient 
in area and suitable in character". (32) At this stage it was a partial 
segregation that the APS envisaged. They still hoped that Africans 
would be able to retain their right to purchase land -here and to 
vote on the terms of a Cape franchise. Harris had, in fact, already 
accepted the principle of segregation in South Africa when he drafted 
a petition for the African Native national Congress delegates relating 
to the 1913 Land Act, and he had described General Bothafs separation 
golicy as one of the "three constructive land policies in the African 
continent" of the present generation. (33) However, there is evidence 
that he did not see segregation as the solution in the Rhodesian context 
until 1920. 
In view of the failure of their campaigm in Britain between 
1914 and 1920, the APS seems to have come to the conclusion in 1920 that 
through an alliance with the settlers they would perhaps have more 
success than they had had so far in urging the LDS land programme. In 
May 1920 the Legislative Council passed a resolution by a large majority 
in favour of Responsible Government. Harris wrote to Cripps: "The 
change in the political si.tuation in Rhodesia encourages us very much and 
we are not without hope that it may yet be possible to secure a general 
settlement of the land question." (34) In September 1920 the APS wrote 
to the Legislative Council smoothing out past differences and hoping that 
the people of Rhodesia would come to see the Society's efforts "in a 
truer light than the mists of controversy and misrepresentation permit 
today" and stressing the moderate nature of their programme. (35) In 
October 1921 the Responsible Government delegates visited London to see 
the Secretary of State, Winston Churchill, and if Harris had any further 
doubts about the settler-APS alliance the meeting with the delegates 
seems to have ended them. "We have had a good deal of discussion with 
the delegates whilst they were here", he wrote to a correspondent in 
Rhodesia, "and have come to the conclusion that there is very little 
ground of difference between us as to what we ought ultimately to 
secure for the natives." Coghlan apparently agreed with Harris that 
land should be set aside for Africans but that it would not affect their 
right to purchase land elsewhere on equal terms with Europeans. 
However, he insisted that Ehmopeans should not move from where they 
already lived and that Africans would have to prove that they had been 
in beneficial occupation for at least twenty years. 
As R. H. Palmer has shown, the settlers who had originally 
seen the Company as their rival regarding land had come to see their 
relationship with Africans increasingly in terms of competition and to 
desire a settlement of the land issue on the basis of some kind of 
segregation. (36) Whereas for the APS segregation was seen as an 
inevitable solution and the only means of securing Africans adequate 
land, for the settlers segregation was the solution to competition. 
Moreover, the settlers had a strong reason for desiring M S  
support for ResponsiSle Government. The Supplemental Charter of 1914 
renewing the Company's responsibi3.ities over Rhodesia had stipulated 
that Responsible Government would be gmated when an absolute majority 
of the Legislative Council favoured it and when the country could 
demonstrate its fitness for Responsible Government in financial and "in 
other respectsn. This last clause referred to the which the 
British Government had always believed it held for the African 
inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia. ( 37) Although the Legislative Council 
were prepared to'concede Imperial responsibility for legislation 
affecting African interests, it was still essential to convince them 
that they had the interests of the African inhabitants at heart, and 
this is where the APS could help them. As Harris wrote to Moffat on 
11th June 1920, 
It seems to me that you will now have to 
establish capacity to rule fin other 
respects! and of course the principal 
difficulty here is the question of the 
Natives. The Colonial Office will want 
to know what capacity you have for 
treating the natives properly. It is 
just here that I m of the strongest 
opinion we can be very helpful to you. 
I hope it may be possible for us as a 
Society to write to Lord Milner and say 
that from our standpoint we have every 
confidence in the men who are asking for 
Responsible Government and that we look 
forward with pleasure to the early grant 
of as full a measure of Responsible 
government as possible. It seems to me 
that if we write such a formal letter to 
the Government coupled with an appeal for 
settling the whole native question along 
common sense lines in Rhodesia we shall 
enormously help you. I am anxious that as 
early as possible and as emphatically as 
possible our Society should tell the people 
in this country that there is nothing 
whatever to fear from you and your successful 
colleagues. This will rob the government 
of a q y  excuse for delaying the grant of 
Responsible Government. I do trust it may 
be possible for us to work together as I am 
sure it is for the welfare of Rhodesia and 
particularly for the welfare of the Natives. (38) 
What Harris envisaged was a bargain between the APS and the 
settlers. In return for "a sound native policyn,by which was meant a 
fair and adequate amount of land being set aside for Africans, 
acceptance by the Responsible Government Party of hperial controls over 
legislation affecting Africans, and the maintenance of native rights to 
franchise, they would give the settlers the support which they needed 
for Responsible Government. (79) 
As their part of the bargain, the APS wrote to Milner on 21st 
July 1920. They outlined their proposed native policy, and added: 
The speeches of the successful candidates 
show an evident sense of responsibility 
towards the natives ... The committee 
believes that it has put nothing forward 
in this 'Setter which in its opinion will 
be refused by the leaders of the Responsible 
Government Party and further desires to say 
that from speeches made by some of the 
unsuccessful candidates and by the public 
record and character of several members known 
to them this Society which is solely 
concerned with the welfare of native races ... 
looks forward as far as the natives are 
concerned with hope to an early grant of 
Responsible Government to the people of 
Rhodesia. (40) 
When the Buxton Report was published in 1920, praising the settlers and 
recommending Responsible Government, the APS sent a deputation to Lord 
Buxton reminding him of his past connections with the Society and 
praising his recommendations. In addition, when the Responsible 
Government Party delegates came to Britain in October 1921, Harris put 
them on to the US' parliamentary and publicity network and introduced 
them to the Labour Advisory Committee. There is evidence that USIS 
support for Responsible Government at this time, when the Chartered 
C o m p w  would have liked Rhodesia to join the Union as offering greater 
security for their mineral investments and the railways, and for 
financial reasons Britain would have liked to delay the grant of 
Responsible Government, and APS and settler pressure were important 
factors in hastening the advent of Responsible Government, 
Although the APS fulfilled their part of the bargain, the 
question which greatly worried the APS'smissionary contacts in Rhodesia, 
Cripps and Idhite, was whether the settlers would honour theirs. Harris, 
carried away by the positive benefits of the association, wrote to 
White: "We rejoice in the grant of Responsible Government because we 
believe we shall get more for the natives through Responsible Government 
than by other means." (41) White was more sceptical: "Candidly I 
am very pessimistic; the new government is not of a kind that will brook 
a moment's disfavour to gain any reform for the natives ... It is called 
Responsible Government but it only represents one section of the 
community. The voice of the native people will never be heard. (42) 
Between 1923 and 1930 it became clear to the APS that the 
scepticism of their missionary allies as to the intentions of the 
settlers towards Africans had been well founded, and this period was one 
of increasing disillusionment for the APS. 
The Responsible Government Constitution gave them. what they 
had asked for: imperial controls over legislation affecting Africans 
and the retention of the "Cape clausen pending a full settlement of the 
land question. However, the Lmperial guarantees proved ineffective to 
some extent and the APS found it much more difficult to operate as a 
pressure group under Responsible Government than under Chartered Company 
rule, while the land settlement - the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 - 
was a bitter disappointment. 
During the 120s the APS developed their ideas on segregation 
further. A. S. Cripps, in An Africa for the Africans, put the view most 
forcibly that encroachments of Europeans were destroying traditional 
African society and segregation would provide Africans with areas where 
they would be free to develop along their own lines. (43) The original 
idea of the Cape franchise was abandoned in favour of the concept of 
Advisory Councils in the reserve areas which would elect European 
representatives to the Legislative Assembly. It was also felt that in 
open competition for the purchase of land Africans would not be able to 
secure enoxgh land and therefore areas should be put aside where Africans 
alone could purchase land. However, it was still felt that they should 
be allowed to retain their right to purchase land on the open market as 
well, but privately it was felt that this should be used as a lever to 
try and get adequate land set aside for Africans and abandoned if 
necessary. (44) 
The Morris Carter Commission of 1925 recommended that the 
"Czpe Clause" should be repealed, that Africans in return would be 
allotted seven million acres of land adjoining the reserves,where land 
was to be held on individual tenure only; Europeans would be given 
seventeen and a half million acres (in addition to the thirty-one 
million acres they already had) and a neutral area of one million acres 
would be allotted where either race could purchase land; the remaining 
nineteen million acres of land, largely uninhabitable, would remain 
unalienated and would be used to redress the balance if miscalculations 
were found to have been made. With the exception of the Neutral Area 
proposal, which was rejected by the Legislative Assembly, the proposals 
of the Morris Carter Commission were incorporated into the Land 
Apportionment Act, which was finally promulgated by the new Labour 
Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, in 1931. 
The MS regarded the Land Apportionment Act as a bitter 
disappcintment to their hopes of an equitable land settlement. They did 
not regard the land provided for Africans as a good bargain, an adequate 
quid pro quo for the loss of their purchasing right. They criticized the 
Commission for giving Africans only seven million acres out of the total 
of forty--three million acres as yet unalienated, while Europeans were to 
get seventeen million, as "a monstrously disapportionate proposition to 
say nothing of its adequacy as a recompense to the Natives for the 
surrender of their existing rights to purchase land which is anywhere 
available". The nineteen million acres of land left over must be held 
in trust by the Crown for future native acquisition. They criticized 
the Commission strongly for being opposed to the granting of communal 
title, which was contrary to native thought and custom. (45) Cripps, 
who had seen segregation in such idealistic terms, was all the more 
disappointed by the Morris Carter recommendations, which he described as 
"a second rate scheme designed with a view to cheapnessf1, The APS 
carried on their opposition to the Land Apportionment Act right up until 
the last minute, although by 1929 Cripps and White had come to the 
conclusion that the Bill was perhaps better than nothing although it 
did not represent what they wanted. By 1929 the APS opposition had 
become irrelevant. The British Government, fearing that if it delayed 
the settlement would be even less favourable to Africans, knowing that 
they could not enforce their opinions if they did not come to an 
agreement with the settler government, and pressed by Moffat who 
threatened to resign if the measure was not passed, gave their approval 
to the Bill. 
The passing of the Land Apportionment Act led to a complete 
rethinking by the APS of their role as protector of African interests 
in Rhodesia. As a result of some disillusionment with the APS, Cripps 
and White turned after 1930 towards the Africans~Associations , the 
Industrial and Commercial Union and the Rhodeeian Bmtu Vote-s 
Association. Harris, too, turned his attention far more to his work at 
the League of Nations in Geneva and looked to such organizations as the 
ILO to secure better conditions for Africans in Rhodesia. Generally, 
after the passing of the Land Apportionment Act, the APS saw Rhodesian 
African interests in a much wider context and looked to Commissions such 
as the Hilton Young Commission to provide statements of policy which 
they hoped would influence the Rhodesian situation. They repeated that 
everything must be done to try and prevent Responsible Government being 
brought about in other countries before adequate safeguzrds had been 
secured for Africans. 
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